This Comment argues that courts can use the tort of false imprisonment to ensure that senior citizens confined to nursing homes or hospitals are not confined against their will. Elderly nursing home patients remain without rights to self-determination despite the protections accorded two other groups: persons civilly committed in psychiatric hospitals and those subject to guardianship proceedings. Although both the commitment and guardianship processes are fraught with abuses, the legal system has at least recognized the potential problerhs and has responded accordingly. 1 " Indeed, many senior citizens who may not have been technically "committed" to a nursing home are, nonetheless, constructively committed. While the law recognizes the right of a guardian to place an unwilling person in a nursing home, even a guardianless old person may, through circumstances beyond her control, find herself unwillingly confined to a nursing home, without clearly defined legal remedies.
This Comment explores the current and potential use of the tort of false imprisonment to redress the elderly patient's lack of rights. It will argue that the overarching problem-the dumping of elderly patients in hospitals and nursing homes-needs to be set against a larger social and political backdrop, and legal solutions need to be placed in context. Specifically, this Comment contends that the disparity in status and resources between the average elderly patient who is unwillingly confined in a nursing home and the nursing home in which she resides places her in constructive or de facto confinement. We should recognize this confinement as equivalent to de jure commitment and grant concomitant recognition and procedural protection.
I. THE PROBLEM

A. Conditions and Demographics
Conditions in nursing homes have been widely studied and frequently decried. 1 It is worth considering the demographics of the pophas assumed direct responsibility."). 11 See, e.g., SENATE INTRODUCTORY REPORT, supra note 5, at III (calling nursing home care "the most troubled and troublesome component of our entire health care system"); Comment, Nursing Home Access: Making the Patient Bill of Rights Work, ulation: there are nearly 1.5 million nursing home residents. The average nursing home resident is eighty-two years old, female, and widowed with no viable relationships except a collateral relative of approximately the same age. She does not have many visitors and suffers from chronic or crippling diseases and some degree of mental impairment. She cannot walk and needs help to take a bath and get dressed. She is afraid. Only four to nineteen percent of people who enter nursing homes get out alive. 12 The fact that most residents receive no visitors 1 underlines their essential isolation and lack of access to legal help. 14 Additionally, many nursing home patients are chronically overmedicated, 5 which may undermine a patient's successful opposition to guardianship or commitment proceedings. 6 
B. Warehousing of the Elderly
Psychiatric hospitals clearly have been abused as a means of dealing with old people who are unwanted by their families or who do not 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 473, 474 (1977) ("Nursing home residents are often abused, and this abuse has been well documented.").
2 See Johnson, Nursing Home Receiverships: Design and Implementation, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 681, 681 n.1 (1981); Comment, supra note 11, at 473-74.
13 See Comment, The Old Age Wall: The Problem of Gaining Access to Nursing Home Residents, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 709, 709 n.11 (1984) (discussing the isolation of nursing home residents from outside social and legal services); see also SEN-ATE INTRODUCTORY REPORT, supra note 5, at 16 ("Since most nursing home patients are in their 70's and 80's, they may well have outlived their own children. Almost 50 percent have no viable relationship with a close relative, and another 30 percent have only collateral relatives near their own age."). ' The isolation is very explicitly maintained by some nursing home administrators, who try to keep out community groups interested in helping residents "by locking the doors in an attempt to maintain the wall of silence between the residents and the outside world, thus preventing the public from interfering with their management of these business enterprises." Comment, supra note 13, at 710. While residents have been endowed statutorily with certain rights, the battle to enforce those rights has to be preceded by the battle to inform residents of them. The role of advocacy is crucial in changing the overall situation for nursing home residents, but the barriers to effective advocacy need to be recognized as part of the problem. 15 See, e.g., B. VLADECK, supra note 3, at 3 ("The overuse of potent medications in nursing homes is a scandal in itself.").
1" In discussing how to prepare to defend patients in commitment and guardianship proceedings, Krauskopf raises, as a "last matter to investigate," the problem of medication changes before a hearing. J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 3.5, at 36-37. She quotes advice that comes from the general context of psychiatric patients, but her use of it implies that she sees the danger of deliberate or indifferent overmedication as equally relevant in the context of geriatric commitment hearings and guardianship proceedings. have familial resources.' The patients' rights movement has responded to that situation by making it harder to commit someone. 8 But as it has become harder to stash difficult relatives in a psychiatric hospital, it has become easier to put them in a nursing home:
The past decade has seen an assault on unwarranted mental commitments at the same time as an increase in funding sources has enabled a large growth in nursing homes. These homes vary widely in quality; many are seriously inadequate and offer an environment even more adverse to an elderly person than a mental hospital. They are likely dumping places for persons who would have been committed at one time. 9 Ironically, however, the confined nursing home resident may be in greater need of legal protection than the committed mental patient, a 11 See J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 29-30 (A large percentage of mental institution inmates are elderly people who were committed for reasons of convenience rather than the severity of their mental impairments.).
18 The legal and social dynamics of civil commitment are, of course, vast and complex topics outside the scope of this paper. A comparison between the situation of the civilly committed mental patient and the involuntarily confined nursing home resident will be made at greater length in Part IV of this Comment. It has often been observed that civil commitment may constitute a form of particularly dangerous social control. Many of these statutes contain a patients' "bill of rights," violation of which will support an action against the nursing home. 27 These rights typically include guarantees of freedom from chemical and physical restraints; privacy; confidentiality; prepared transfer; informed consent; and freedom from abuse. 2 8 To the extent that particular statutory provisions cannot reasonably be construed to cover the situation in which a nursing home resident is confined against her will, the need for a common law remedy is clear. 29 
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE RUBRIC OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT
TO NURSING HOME CONFINEMENT
A. The Use of Tort: General Considerations
One might think that the notorious conditions in nursing homes would have spawned a tremendous amount of litigation challenging the care and treatment of nursing home residents. This has not been the case. Litigation has centered primarily around negligence; the typical nursing home case deals with a simple but poorly documented fall. 3 0 Nevertheless, it has been argued that tort law can play an important role:
The irony is that the modern system of tort litigation possesses the sophistication to make a meaningful contribution to the improvement of long-term care. ("The incontrovertible fact.., is that the most comprehensively written and vigorously enforced regulations in the world can only work to a small degree to protect dependents from abuse."). 20 See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-2, at 69; see also Butler, supra note 8, app. A at 662-63 (listing reported nursing home cases, including the nature of injury, the age and sex of plaintiff, the disposition of the case, and the damages when awarded).
1989]
its practitioners are imaginative. Today's post-realist amalgam of economics and hornbook doctrine permits adventurous functional manipulation to achieve not only compensation, but also finely tuned regulation." 1 There are many reasons, in general, tort law has been inadequately used to remedy nursing home abuses and, in particular, few false imprisonment claims have been filed against nursing homes. This Comment argues that this dearth of cases represents not a lack of need, but rather an undervaluing of essential rights that litigation may be able to help protect. Tort law has only recently been recognized as an important part of nursing home litigation-one that can address inadequate and inefficient government regulatory systems. 3 The tort of false imprisonment, in particular, has lagged behind.
B. Big Town Nursing Home v. Newman" 3
An action for the intentional tort of false imprisonment may be maintained against a nursing home. 4 In the leading case, Big Town Nursing Home v. Newman, the plaintiff, who had "Parkinson's disease, arthritis, heart trouble, a voice impediment, and a hiatal hernia," was kept against his will in a nursing home. 35 He tried to escape five or six times but each time was brought back without his consent. He was not allowed to use the telephone or have visitors unless the manager knew them, 6 and he was locked up with "senile patients, drug addicts, alcoholics, [the] mentally disturbed, incorrigibles, and uncontrollables," even though nursing home personnel knew this was inappropriate treatment for him. 37 The appellate court held that ample evidence existed to support the jury's finding of false imprisonment, concluding that the nursing home "acted in the utter disregard of plaintiff's legal rights, knowing there was no court order for commitment and that the admission agreement provided he was not to be kept against his will." 38 An authority in the field of nursing home law has observed that he other central case in this area is Pounders v. Trinity Court Nursing Home, Inc. There, the plaintiff testified that she was not allowed to have visitors, use the telephone, or write anyone. She was told further that if she tried to run away, she would be brought back. One of her reasons for not leaving was that the home had taken her shoes, 4 1 and she did not feel able to go out in bedroom slippers. The Pounders court held that, because the nursing home had not physically restrained Mrs. Pounders, it had not "imprisoned" her.'
D. The Rubric
The tort of false imprisonment is especially interesting when viewed in the larger context of tort law. It is, of course, an intentional tort. 43 Intentional tort theory has been overshadowed because of the emphasis on negligence in modern malpractice litigation. Yet existing studies of nursing home conditions suggest that the most troublesome conduct is that typically associated with intentional torts." Despite the paucity of reported cases, intentional tort doctrine thus has an important contribution to make to nursing home litigation." The abuses commonly suffered by nursing home residents are ideally suited to redress by false imprisonment causes of action. 4 ' From a practical standpoint, however, false imprisonment has been criticized as lacking the flexibility of a negligence cause of action.' 7 Another obstacle to the use of the false imprisonment rubric in nursing home litigation has been the tendency of courts to interpret the phrase "false imprisonment" literally, thereby restricting its application. The trial court in Pounders, for instance, gave an erroneously limited statement of the law, which proved fatal to Mrs. Pounders' case: "False imprisonment means to be in custody against your will, to have restraints, such as chains, handcuffs, locked doors, barriers or keeping someone behind walls or within the premises, under a hidden identity or things of that nature." 4 As Prosser has noted, however, "too much emphasis has been placed upon the technical name of the tort."
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The Restatement notes that:
(1)An actor is subject to liability to another for false inprisonment if (a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
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Section 36 specifies what constitutes confinement:
(1) To make the actor liable for false imprisonment, the other's confinement within the boundaries fixed by the actor must be complete.
(2) The confinement is complete although there is a reasonable means of escape, unless the other knows of it. 1
One comment to Section 36 suggests that what is "complete" confinement will vary from person to person: "[Elven though there may be a perfectly safe avenue of escape, the other is not required to take it if the circumstances are such as to make it offensive to a reasonable sense of a. There is a confinement by physical barriers, under the rule stated in § 35, if the barriers are actually efficient to restrain the other or, though they are actually inefficient to do so, the other believes them to be efficient and the one setting the barriers intends him so to believe.
b. An act which prevents another from availing himself of a reasonable means of escape from the area of confinement may result in a confinement by physical barriers. 54 The physical limitations experienced by the elderly patient, when coupled with her dependence on her caretakers, combine to create a forceful case for false imprisonment. Indeed, one of the Restatement's guiding illustrations is of the "cripple" whose crutches have been taken by A; her resulting inability to walk amounts to confinement. 55 
E. The Failure of the Rubric
Where does this leave Mrs. Pounders? There are several ways in which the typical nursing home resident may be as effectively imprisoned in a home or hospital as the prototypical imprisonee. The imprisonment may begin before she sets foot in the home, through her real and/or perceived lack of alternatives. Mrs. Pounders did not want to enter the home, according to the court, but did so without protest because she had no place else to go. Her status and lack of bargaining power rendered her unable to consent. While courts cannot change the factors leading to the absence of choice, they can recognize the element of coercion. Again it is important to recognize that "the interest is in a sense a mental one," 5 analogous to the apprehension of contact in assault cases. 5 " Furthermore, the action may be maintained without proof of actual damage. 58 Recognition of the mental or subjective element might overcome the most difficult hurdle in false imprisonment litigation: the physical element. The Pounders court viewed this obstacle as insurmountable: No false imprisonment existed because there was "no evidence whatever either of physical force or of any threat of physical force. To the contrary, Mrs. Pounders could have left the nursing home at will, but she simply had nowhere to go and chose to stay." 59 Obviously, the easiest cases will involve patients who are subjected to physical barriers or actual physical force. In such cases, the subjective element is irrelevant. Big Town presented a combination of physical and mental restraints; the plaintiff was punished by being locked and taped in a "restraint chair" for more than five hours."' The court did not rest its holding on this factor alone, however; it found evidence of confinement in that the nursing home prevented him from using the telephone, 61 locked up his clothes, told him that he could not be released from the ward until he obeyed the rules, and detained him for fifty-one days despite his persistent demands to be released. Most significant, there was no court proceeding to confine the patient. The court held that the defendant nursing home "acted in the utter disregard of plaintiff's legal rights, knowing there was no court order for commitment, and that the admission agreement provided he was not to be kept against his will." 2 False imprisonment doctrine, by acknowledging the restrictive power of threats, provides courts with a way to assess individual cases using the subjective effect of the threats on the patient. Threats to restrain are more difficult to prove than literal restraint, but, as discussed above, they may play a significant role in keeping the confined person 532, 535 (1953) 64 to remember that confinement can result from duress other than threats of physical force. 65 For example, an Illinois appellate court held that a threat to commit a patient to a state hospital constituted a present, not future, threat. 6 Furthermore, the defendant bears the burden of justifying the confinement of the plaintiff; 7 the law does not require the confined person to justify her desire to leave the nursing home. 8 6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 40 comment a (1965).
[T]he actor's threat [to confine the other] may be by words as well as by other acts. It is not necessary that he do any other act actually or apparently effectual in carrying a threat into immediate execution. It is enough that he threatens to apply and has the apparent intention and ability to apply force to the other's person immediately upon the other's attempting to escape from the area within which it is the actor's intention to confine him.
Id.
The illustration to section 40 emphasizes that the immediacy requirement goes to the thwarting of the attempted escape, not the time of the threat: "B, standing at the door some feet away, says to A, 'If you attempt to leave this room, I will knock you down.' B makes no threatening gesture. A, in submission to the threat remains in the room. B has confined A." Id. illustration 1. Thus, the need for a so-called "present threat" in making out a case of false imprisonment has been liberally construed. See, e.g., Hales v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., 260 N.C. 568, 570, 133 S.E.2d 225, 227 (1963) (noting that words that cause a reasonable apprehension in plaintiff concerning her ability to exercise her liberty constitutes false imprisonment); Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 230, 317 S.E.2d 748, 755 (1985) ("The tort of false imprisonment may be committed by words alone... and by merely operating on the will of the individual . . ").
e' "Even the best nursing homes are total institutions that form an inherently intimidating environment that has a debilitating effect on the resident and the resident's sense of personal control over both mundane and major activities." M. KAPP, supra note 2, at 80. 68 See Geddes v. Daughters of Charity, 348 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding false imprisonment shown when psychiatric hospital detained plaintiff after plaintiff "begged" to be released, because "further detention in the hospital subsequent to such withdrawal of the consent consituted a false imprisonment"). See generally 40
III. REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT
RUBRIC
The reasons for the failure of the false imprisonment rubric may be stated briefly: unlike nursing homes, nursing home residents lack political and economic power. The institutionalized elderly are in a double bind, however. While they may perceive themselves to be politically and economically impotent, courts and the political process assume that the elderly as a group have more power than they actually have, and that therefore nursing home residents are not in need of special protections. e9 This Part explains the failure of the false imprisonment rubric by examining the societal, economic, and political underpinnings of both the tort system and the nursing home industry. The analysis assumes that the legal problem cannot be understood outside of its political, societal, and economic context. Part IV discusses possible legal solutions within this context.
A. "Internal" and Inherent Obstacles
The problems of perception are both internal and external, individual and societal. Age, like class, race, and gender[,] will affect the extent to which and the way in which the experience of injury is transformed into a claim for legal redress: the sense of entitlement to physical, mental, and emotional well-being... the feeling of competence to assert a claim and to withstand retaliation; the capacity to mobilize the legal process, which includes choosing and controlling a lawyer and preparing evidence; and financial and emotional resources, which will affect the quality of legal representation obtained and the ability of the claimant to overcome opposition and delay in order to pursue negotiation or litigation to a satisfactory conclusion. nevertheless crucially affects how one views oneself vis-a-vis the legal system. The paucity of nursing home litigation-most of it filed by survivors 7 2 -underlines the self-and-other selection involved. In short, the elderly, like other oppressed groups, are effectively barred from tort recovery. 73 The legal system as a whole, the courts, and even the victims (because they assume they have no redress) create and perpetuate this process of exclusion.
The relative lack of nursing home litigation points less to the absence of a problem than to the economics and politics of nursing home litigation. Nursing homes are well-financed and organized; the patients are unorganized, and, by definition, dependent on others. Nevertheless, although the tort of false imprisonment has its limitations, it can be used to protect basic physical and emotional rights of nursing home residents.
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The use of tort law in this context raises specific practical and political problems. Although obvious, it is important to remember that the potential litigants are the victims; precisely what makes them so vulnerable as victims renders them ineffective as litigants: "Resident plaintiffs in reported tort cases range from 67 to 95 years; females outnumbered males more than three to one and the plaintiffs were hemiplegic, senile, incontinent and unsteady in ambulation. ' ' These characteristics accord with those of nursing home residents generally.
76 Of course, the combination of old age and low earning capacity translates into paltry damage awards. 7 The victims' very powerlessness-the cause of these actions to begin with-makes it difficult to bring tort claims. Why does a person reside in a nursing home where she does not want to be? She has no place else to go; she has no relatives; she has relatives who are unwilling or unable to house her; she cannot take care of herself; she has significant physical and/or mental impairment. Recognition of these factors, however, should not replace the court's independent inquiry into the plaintiff's claim. Mrs. Pounders ended up in a home because the relatives with whom she was staying became dissatisfied with the stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span." (citation omitted) arrangement. The court concluded therefore that "she simply had nowhere to go and chose to stay." 8 Mrs. Pounders' case, however, illustrates the possibility of alternative arrangements, because she ultimately found a place with another relative. Furthermore, the fact that no obvious alternatives may exist to a nursing home does not establish that the resident is not being falsely imprisoned; at the very least, a different nursing home may be preferable. It is important to keep the practical problems distinct from the legal questions; consent must not be determined by convenience or by unexamined assumptions that the elderly "belong" in nursing homes. 79 The profile of the typical plaintiff in nursing home litigation reflects the profile of the typical nursing home resident. 8 " If she is helpless, disoriented, mentally impaired, or disabled, she is per se dependent on the very people who are not protecting her rights. These are not reasons to refrain from bringing such actions; these are reasons for the courts to be vigilant about protecting the rights of those who may be unable to protect themselves.
B. Political Factors
To use tort law effectively, one must place the individual in a larger social and political context, a step the courts are reluctant to take. Even Mrs. Pounder's champion, the dissenting Justice Purtle, suggests that the case is "no doubt of little consequence to anyone other than Margaret Pounders."'" He observes, however, that "[a]s it is with a large number of our senior citizens, she dreaded the thought of being placed in a nursing home." 82 The juxtaposition of these two statements reveals an interesting anomaly. The first statement suggests a common willingness to trivialize and isolate the elderly individual. Implicit in the second statement is the recognition that this disabled elderly woman belongs to a class of people who cannot control their most basic choices. They lack liberty in the most fundamental sense. At the same time, individual members of this class, especially if they are female or members of a racial minority, are perceived not to have political clout. They 11 See B. VLADECK, supra note 3, at 215-18 (discussing the pervasive bias in this country toward institutionalization of the elderly). Vladeck's major suggestion for nursing home reform is to encourage the funding of noninstitutionalized care rather than nursing homes. [Vol. 137:903
are foolish in the particular and powerless in the aggregate. 8 3 The tort of false imprisonment requires us to ask whether the victim has agreed to be imprisoned, but the question of consent cannot be understood outside the context of power relations. Pounders found that, although Mrs. Pounders did not want to enter the home, "she went without protest." ' Therefore, by agreeing to surrender her freedom of motion, she agreed to be imprisoned. This double bind is uncomfortably reminiscent of the rape victim who does not want to have sex but cannot safely refuse; her "consent" is compelled by the situation. 5 The analogy can serve us in another way. One legacy of the women's movement stems from the axiom "the personal is political." 8 6 Individual interactions between two people cannot be understood apart from overarching questions of status and power. We perpetuate inequalities by our perception of some wrongs as trivial, or "merely" personal: "This is a very close question and no doubt of little consequence to anyone other than Margaret Pounders. It is important to recognize that the dumping of the elderly in nursing homes and hospitals is a problem with political dimensions, no matter how we define "political." From the legislative perspective, nursing-home political action committees are big political contributors. 8 In contrast, "[flew nursing-home patients vote. They are not organized. There is no patient PAC [compared to the powerful nursing-83 This Comment does not mean to ignore the existence of the senior power movement. The political power of the elderly has been exhaustively studied and is considerably more complex a subject than is herein acknowledged. See J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 9-14 (surveying the literature and noting that the power of the aged has been both overestimated and underestimated). But while there has been extensive consideration of the elderly as a political force, it has also been argued that "[tihe elderly are perceived as being more effectively organized than they are." Id. at 103. This Comment argues that the court looking at the individual in isolation may not be able to see how the individual is imprisoned.
84 Pounders, 265 Ark. at 2, 576 S.W.2d at 935. 11 The Restatement hints at this, 1965 style: "A, a young man, takes B, a girl, for a ride in his car, and offers indecent liberties. A refuses to allow B to leave the car unless she consents, and drives her several miles. A has confined B." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 36 comment c, illustration 9 (1965).
88 " 'To say that the personal is political means that gender as a division of power is discoverable and verifiable through women's intimate experience of sexual objectification, which is definitive of and synonymous with women's lives as gender female. ' There are complex issues involved in translating the recognition of the elderly as a political force into significant legal protection for nursing home residents. One danger is to characterize the elderly monolithically, to see the label of "elderly" as all-embracing. As the burgeoning field of "political gerontology" 9 makes clear, the creation of old people as a political bloc involves certain pitfalls. Another problem is derived from the "special treatment/interest" model, which, while providing certain essential services, separates the elderly from the rest of the population. Once old people are set aside as a problem group that needs special help, their resource deprivation must be maintained for their caretakers to justify their existence. Perhaps because more bureaucrats are needed to deliver indirect services as opposed to direct services, more resources are funneled into referral agencies at the local level instead of housing or income maintenance. 1 The elderly are, as a group, exhaustively subjected to social control by the state and others. The realities of aging help to contribute to dependency, and the separateness of being a problem group stigmatizes the elderly, even in the name of reform.
Thus even the solutions perpetuate the problems. Nevertheless, age-based stereotypes are less damaging than the present alternative. The elderly patient, involuntarily confined to a nursing home, is subjected to "forced communal living, regimentation, infantilism, segregation from the outside world, staff impersonalism, and task orientation." 9 2 All of these conditions facilitate a complete degradation of self. While the need for political activity is great, the potential for organizing is low. Residents who refuse to submit to this institutional routine may face the use of chemical or mechanical restraints. 9 " Other restraints, such as threats, social disapproval, and fear of retaliation, may be less tangible but equally coercive. 9 s9 Id. at 52. o See J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 3 (defining the field of political gerontology as "the study of power as it involves the elderly").
91 See id. at 241. 92 Id. at 233.
See id.
Another danger is that the nursing home promotes social control through drugs or therapies that further the larger goals of the institution: the continuation of the individual's inability to act autonomously. See id. at 233. Again, what would otherwise be legally protected-for example, the ability of the individual to be free from restraint-will not be considered restraint if ordered under medical supervision. The Patients' Bill of Rights constitutes a condition of participation for "skilled nursing facilities" and a standard to be met for "intermediate care Furthermore, what gains have been accomplished may stall further progress. Many protections have evolved from the patient-as-consumer model, a product of the patients' rights movement, 9 5 itself an outgrowth of the civil rights movement. 9 6 One possible consequence of this model is that it may assume elderly patients have more bargaining power than they actually possess, presupposing that the marketplace is an adequate regulatory mechanism, and that empowerment comes from economic clout, not political change.
C. Economic Factors
When attempting to understand the economic factors underlying the relationship between the average nursing home resident and her nursing home, one must look not only at the economics of the nursing home business, especially compared to the relative inadequacy of the patient's resources, but also at the tort system itself. The numerical disparity between medical malpractice cases and nursing home cases 98 See Caldwell & Kapp, supra note 29, at 41 ("The notion of patients' rights is rooted in at least two sociological phenomena: 'consumerism,' which advocates a questioning, better-informed public; and the civil rights movement, which champions the cause of vulnerable and powerless minorities.").
injured person has a short life expectancy and no earning capacity, the standard measures of damages."" 8 Also, the type of injury the tort of false imprisonment attempts to remedy-the resident's lack of autonomy and self-determination-while recognized in the abstract as important, may be perceived as too intangible to warrant remuneration. 99 Again, however, the tort itself acknowledges the importance of the mental component. 0 0
Furthermore, the question of how to use tort remedies involves a consideration of the role tort law plays in our legal system and society; it does not exist apart from the economic and political values it embodies and perpetuates: "Contemporary tort law is intimately related to the rise of capitalism, as both cause and effect."' 0 ' The economic underpinnings of tort law raise a number of issues relevant to nursing home litigation. First, at least seventy percent of nursing homes are operated for profit;' 0 2 the care and housing of the disabled elderly1 0 3 are secondary to profit considerations. Even more particularly, tort law is inextricably bound up in the economics not only of the industry, but of its victims. If damages are dependent on earning power and "worth," the typical nursing home resident is not likely to engender much economic respect.' 0 4
As already suggested, the absence of leading cases and the relative lack of interest in nursing home litigation 0 5 speak volumes about the 08 Butler, supra note 8, at 641. However, courts have begun to recognize the inherent disadvantages and lack of incentive elderly nursing home residents face in bringing suits against nursing homes. See, e.g., Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 369-70, 489 N.E.2d 1374, 1383 (1986) (holding that the legislature could allow treble damages for ordinary negligence in order to encourage private enforcement of the state Nursing Home Care Reform Act, when actual damages might not be enough to warrant instituting an action).
" Furthermore, we tend to assume that dependence, both physical and social, is a natural or inevitable consequence of growing old, and that aging equals lack of selfdetermination. These assumptions have been increasingly challenged by fields as diverse as geriatric medicine (which has shown that "senility" is not a natural consequence of growing old, but a catch-all for distinct biological events such as Alzheimer's disease, depression, and poor nutrition) and political gerontology (which has articulated the nature of elder power). situation. They also raise some specific practical problems for the would-be nursing home litigator. The nursing home industry has become and continues to be increasingly corporate in nature; large corporate chains now dominate the field in contrast to twenty-five years ago, when nursing homes were primarily owned by sole proprietors. 0 6 This fact has a pervasive impact. The optimistic interpretation is that nursing home residents may benefit from juries' recognition of the economic mismatch: if they hear the financial report of a large, "good investment" nursing home corporation, they "may seriously wonder if too much money is being spent on corporate growth rather than on necessary patient care."' 0° On the other hand, this litigation pits a vulnerable and dependent older person against the resources of a wealthy corporation. Nevertheless, it is important not to assume the victimization of the nursing home resident as an inevitable fact of life, lest such victimization become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: BORROWING FROM OTHER RUBRICS
A. Reasoning from Civil Commitment and Guardianship
Despite the current situation, the false imprisonment tort action has a significant role to play in protecting basic rights of nursing home residents, particularly in conjunction with the concepts of de facto guardianship and commitment. The problems of civil commitment have long been recognized, and persons threatened with commitment are endowed with certain basic due process rights to protect their freedom of liberty.' 0 8 The standard generally is danger to oneself or others.' 0 9 There are also less stringently scrutinized protections for persons who are assigned guardians."' In other words, once there is a legal process, there is some degree of scrutiny, however minimal or pro forma. Indeed, abundant evidence exists that these protections are inadequate. guardian without any guardianship proceeding taking place. The nursing home's rule that a patient be released to the person who arranged for her admission' 1 6 constituted a form of ad hoc, de facto guardianship.
In some situations, courts have recognized that even patients who have been placed voluntarily in institutions may be subject to what amounts to de facto confinement and have accorded them legal protections similar to those given to persons who have been involuntarily committed to institutions. 17 These cases are cause for hope. Courts have found de facto confinement in the case of residents who are disabled, lack readily available resources, or do not have spouse, parents, friends, or a guardian."" De facto confinement, like the tort of false imprisonment, has at its heart the acknowledgment that not all restraints are physical or even literal, and that what amounts to confinement will vary from situation to situation." 9 Mrs. Pounders' case underlines the need to recognize the binding nature of de facto confinement, which may come from social control, medication, threats, and nursing home "policy." Pounders held that there was no literal constraint, despite the nursing home's refusal to release Mrs. Pounders with her consent into the custody of a relative who was willing to take her home with her. The nursing home rejected the relative's request and "informed her it was the policy of [the nursing home] to release residents of the home only to the party who entered them into the facility."' a 0 The potential for abuse-specifically, collusion between the nursing home and relatives to "dump" the resident-is obvious.' 2 ' In this case, so insistent was the nursing home in The disabled resident of a nursing home requires protection akin to that afforded to the psychiatric patient. Although these protections are for the most part statutory, their existence testifies to the special vulnerability of those subject to social control by labelling and to the power of context to create constructive imprisonment.
120 Pounders, 265 Ark. at 5-6, 576 S.W.2d at 936 (Purtle, J., dissenting). 121 Big Town is shorter on narrative, but it also suggests that Newman was essentially dumped by a relative who found him difficult. See Big Town Nursing Home, Inc., v. Newman, 461 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (finding that Newman was taken to the home by a nephew who "signed the admission papers and paid one month's care in advance"). Newman's repeated attempts to escape (he left at least five times and each time was brought back) indicate that the relative was not eager or able to house him. A false imprisonment action presumably could also be brought against the relative.
keeping Mrs. Pounders that even the intervention of a lawyer hired by the relative attempting to free Mrs. Pounders did not sway it. It refused to relinquish her without the permission of the relative who had brought her there to begin with. Interestingly, it was only when the lawyer threatened to file a writ of habeas corpus that the nursing home decided to release Mrs. Pounders.
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V. CONCLUSION
Elderly residents of nursing homes lack autonomy to make basic choices and secure basic rights. This problem cuts across doctrinal boundaries. The issue is not only complex from a legal standpoint, but also necessarily involves political, sociological, and medical considerations.
One approach to nursing home abuses has been through patients' bills of rights.
1 23 These mechanisms presuppose a certain degree of autonomy and self-determination, and there are inequalities that prevent them from being meaningful.1 24 Tort law traditionally has been fluid, and it has a unique role to play in the drama of securing basic rights for nursing home residents. But "modern American legal thought continues to be premised on the distinction between private law and public law. Private law is still assumed to be about private actors with private rights, making private choices ... .125 These assumptions are implicit in decisions such as Pounders and they are why the doctrinal rubrics, taken on their own terms, are inadequate. Mrs. Pounders' imprisonment cannot be understood by courts who insist that only physical imprisonment is true imprisonment. Mrs. Pounders was tied down by her age, her sense of her lack of alternatives, nursing home policies, her status as an elderly person in society, her own disabilities, her perception of herself, and, finally, by antiquated and literalist notions of what constitutes false imprisonment.
122 See Pounders, 265 Ark. at 6, 576 S.W.2d at 937. The majority saw no significance in this fact: "That [the attorney] saw fit to suggest the possibility of an application for a writ of habeas corpus did not somehow have the effect of physically imprisoning Mrs. Pounders, who was upstairs in her room and could have walked out by herself if she had chosen to do so. " Id. 12 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
